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THE PRICE OF OPTIONS  ILLIQUIDITY 
 
 
A B S T R A C T  
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of illiquidity on the value of 
currency options. We use a unique data set which allows us to explore this 
issue in special circumstances where options are issued by a central bank and 
are not traded prior to maturity. The value of these options is compared to 
similar options traded on the exchange. We find that the non-tradable options 
are priced about 21 percent less than the exchange traded options. This gap 
cannot be arbitraged away due to transactions costs and the risk that the 
exchange rate will change during the bidding process.  
 
 One important aspect of research on the micro-structure of financial markets is 
the effect of liquidity on financial assets. The early micro-structure literature views 
liquidity as a determinant of transactions costs, affecting the bid-ask spreads but not  
equilibrium prices.1 More recent studies that deal with the effect of liquidity on the prices 
of financial assets present evidence that illiquidity has an adverse effect on asset values 
(e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1991) on bond prices, Silber (1991) on restricted stocks, 
Longstaff (1995) on liquidity, volatility and price).2  
These papers deal with the effect of liquidity on stocks and bonds. How about 
options?  Does illiquidity of an option affect its price? Thus far, to our knowledge, this 
issue has not been discussed in the micro-structure literature. 3   
Though illiquidity in the options market has been mentioned with regard to the 
bid-ask spread, it has not been discussed in the context of the option price itself, partly 
due to the fact that the concept of liquidity is not trivial when it comes to options.4 For 
example, to price an option in the Black-Scholes world we need a market where the 
option payoffs can be replicated. Thus, if the market for the underlying asset trades 
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continuously (i.e., is liquid) we can price any option, whether it trades continuously or 
not.  If, however, the underlying asset is not very liquid and/or the price process is not a 
diffusion process (e.g., it is a jump process or one with stochastic volatility) we cannot 
price the option by replication. Under these circumstances how would an illiquid option 
fare compared to a liquid option? Should the illiquid option, when issued, command a 
premium or sell at a discount, compared to the liquid option? In a market where options 
are created by market participants, illiquid options should sell, if at all, for about the 
same price as liquid options since buyers will never pay more for illiquid ones and 
sellers will never sell for less.  However, should illiquid options sell for less in case the 
writer of these (non-tradable) options is a central bank, which sells the options in an 
auction to the highest bidder? Clearly, if these options could be replicated costlessly with 
liquid options then they should sell for the same price. Since the liquid options in our 
case do not have the same characteristics (they differ by strike price and expiration 
dates), replicating the illiquid options with the liquid ones would generate transactions 
costs. In such a case, these options should sell at a discount determined mainly by the 
transactions costs. 
 The objective of this study is to examine empirically the effect of illiquidity on 
option values. Are illiquid options selling at a discount? Is the discount fully accounted 
for by the transactions costs? The Israeli currency market provides a unique opportunity 
for testing the effect of illiquidity on options prices. There are two types of options on the 
U.S. dollar (paid in Israeli currency - NIS): options issued and traded on the Tel-Aviv 
Stock Exchange (TASE) and non-negotiable options sold weekly by the Central Bank of 
Israel (BI) in sealed bid auctions. The main differences between these two types of 
options are: (1) While the exchange traded (ET) options are created by market 
participants and everyone is a potential buyer or writer, the sole writer of the BI options 
 3 
is the central bank; and (2) the ET options are continuously traded while the central 
bank options are issued in an auction and can not be traded prior to expiration. 5 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data 
and the methodology. In Section II we present and discuss the results of the statistical 
tests. The main findings are summarized in Section III. 
 
I. Data and Methodology 
1st. Data 
 The sample period starts with the inception of trading in currency options on the 
TASE in April 1994, ending in June 1997.6 The BI options data include: the three-month 
at-the-money (ATM) call options for the corresponding period, the three-month at-the-
money-forward (ATMF) calls and the six-month ATMF calls.  The BI option prices that 
we use are the average price in each auction.  The ET options have fixed exercise 
prices at .05 spreads (e.g., K=3.45, K=3.50, K=3.55) and a given calendar expiration 
date, while the BI options are always issued ATMF, or ATM, with 90 or 180 days to 
expiration.  Only on rare occasions will the expiration date and/or the exercise price of 
the two options match. 
 The total number of observations of BI options is 566.  272 of those are ATMF 
options with 90 days to expiration, 127 are ATMF options with 180 days to expiration 
and 167 of them are ATM options with 90 days to expiration.7 For the ET options we 
used the transaction prices of trades done on the same days that auctions were held 
(Tuesdays and Thursdays).8 In addition to the option premium (price), we also collected 
the daily NIS/$ exchange rate, the domestic short term interest rate and the three-month 
Euro-dollar rate. Other inputs are given by the specification of the option contracts. The 
BI options data were obtained from the Bank of Israel and the ET options data were 
obtained from the TASE. 
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An important aspect of the data is the auction process. The BI options are issued 
in a sealed-bid discriminating auction. The process starts at 9:00 a.m. with an electronic 
announcement of the central bank to all banks on the details of the auction, notional 
amount, strike price, days to expiration, and minimum bidding price. This announcement 
goes out immediately from the banks to all their clients. By 11:00 a.m. all interested 
clients submit their bids through their banks (branch offices) directly to the central bank. 
At the same time, the banks submit their bids for their own account, independent of the 
branch offices, to the central bank.9 The results are known within half an hour (used to 
be one hour). Since only the banks can participate in the auction, the clients pay a 
commission, charged by the banks, of 0.25 percent-0.50 percent (lower for preferred 
clients) of the options premium. Every bank is submitting the bids of many clients such 
that in every auction there are potentially many participants (the Bank of Israel is not 
making public the number of bids submitted by all the banks). The options cannot be 
traded prior to maturity and the sole writer is the Bank of Israel. During the sample 
period the daily average notional amount was 5.27 million dollars for the BI options and 
9.98 million dollars for the Exchange traded (ET) options. 
 
B.   Methodology 
 Our objective is to study the effect of illiquidity on option prices. Is an illiquid 
option valued less than a corresponding liquid option? The answer to this question is not 
clear since both, the writer and the buyer, face the same problem, lack of liquidity. If, 
however, we can identify clearly the options’ writers and claim that they are indifferent to 
liquidity but the buyers are not, then it can be argued that the price should be lower the 
less liquid the option is. This discount, however, should be a function of the extent to 
which one can replicate the payoffs of the illiquid option. The non-tradable BI options 
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provide a unique opportunity to test the effect of liquidity on options' prices compared to 
the ET liquid options.  
The options offered by the Bank of Israel are issued in an auction process where 
the bank is a passive writer and their premiums should reflect the buyers concern with 
them being non-tradable. It can be argued that the options buyers could write similar ET 
options to lock-in arbitrage profits. However, a perfect arbitrage, which is riskless to 
expiration, is possible only if the ET options have exactly the same characteristics as the 
BI options. Since they differ by strike prices and time to maturity, the only possible 
arbitrage is to replicate the BI options with the ET options and rebalance the position as 
the market changes. The replication is costly and therefore should be reflected in the 
discount.  
The difference in strike prices and time to maturity requires special care when 
the BI options are compared to the ET options. To deal with this problem we start with a 
simple test, which we consider an indication test, that compares the Implied Standard 
Deviations (ISD) computed from the ET options to those computed from the BI options. 
We use the same parameters for both options on days that the BI options are issued 
except for strike prices and days to expiration. The ISD is weighted by vega in the 
following way: 
   WISD W ISDi i
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iISD is the ISD from option i;  
The justification for vega weighting is as follows. Since at-the-money options are 
more liquid than away from the money, we used a weighting scheme that gives larger 
weight to at-the-money options, which are more sensitive to volatility. Also, the larger 
weight given to at-the-money options reduces the effect, if any, of a volatility “smile”.  
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The results of our initial test, are presented in Table I which compares the 
Implied Standard Deviations (ISD) computed from the ET options to those computed 
from the BI options.10  
 
Insert Table I here 
The mean ISD (and the median) of the BI options is significantly lower than the 
ET options, 0.0492 vs. 0.0639, using the entire sample. Note that while the ATMF 
options show a difference of 1.5 percent to 1.7 percent on average, the ATM options 
show a smaller difference, about 1.2 percent. One possible explanation that the ATM 
options show less of a deviation than the ATMF options is the presence of a selection 
bias. While in all auctions (except nine) for three-month ATMF options and for six-month 
ATMF options there were bidders (in most cases the demand was much larger than the 
supply), in about 40 percent of the ATM options there were no bidders. The main reason 
that there were not many bidders for these options was the fact that, given the high 
interest rate differential between the domestic and the foreign rate, the ATM options 
were in fact deep-in-the-money options and most clients were not interested in options 
that were practically forward contracts.11 A second reason was the difference in the 
minimum price that was set for the ATM options and ATMF options. When we examined 
the minimum price series for both options, we found that the minimum price of the 
ATMF options implied, on the average, a volatility of 4 percent while the minimum price 
set for the ATM options in many cases implied a volatility of almost 6 percent. For these 
reasons there was less interest in the ATM options. Thus, the ATM options are a biased 
sample since they exclude all potential participants who did not bid because of the 
above mentioned reasons. The ATMF options, on the other hand, had most of the time 
demand much larger than the amount offered by the Bank of Israel. We show later that 
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the demand for the ATMF options was about four times larger, on the average, than the 
amount offered. We, therefore, focus on the ATMF options in the tests that follow. 
The problem with the use of implied standard deviations is that the assumptions 
of the B-S model do not strictly hold. In particular, the assumption of a log-normal 
distribution of the underlying asset and the requirement that all securities trade 
continuously. We argue that the dynamics of the exchange rate (NIS/US$) in our 
sample has a negligible effect on the empirical results for the following reasons. First, 
the exchange rate bands, imposed by the central bank, are on a basket of currencies 
including the dollar. Although the dollar's weight in the basket is about 55 percent, the 
band is not as restrictive vis-á-vis the dollar. Second, empirical evidence indicates that 
for bands larger than 10 percent, the value of at-the-money options is only slightly 
different from the B-S value which assumes no FX bands (see Ingersoll (1997)). Third, 
in a study on the Israeli currency market Samer HajYehia (1997) claims that the B-S 
model is robust to the NIS/$ exchange rate dynamics during the sample period that we 
used.  
In an attempt to deal with the dynamics of the exchange rate, especially the 
issue of FX bands which is not consistent with a B-S environment, we use two 
alternative methods. In both methods, we compare the premium of the BI options to a 
synthetic premium obtained from the ET options. While the first method uses the ISD of 
ET options to compute the synthetic option price, which is similar to comparing the ISDs, 
the second method uses the B-S model to compute only the weight, in creating the 
synthetic price, such that the effect of the B-S model on our test is minimal.  
 
B.1  Method 1 
The first method is illustrated with option prices recorded on June 18, 1996. 
Table II provides an example using two exchange traded options which differ by maturity 
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only. These options straddle the maturity of the BI options which are issued with three 
months to maturity. We use their ISD to compute a weighted ISD and use this figure as 
an input to compute the “theoretical” price of the BI options. The auction price of the BI 
option (0.0438 NIS per 1 $US), on June 18, 1996, is compared to the synthetic option 
(0.0501 NIS per 1 $US).  In this example, the percentage difference is interpreted as the 
price of illiquidity or “Illiquidity Discount,” which is about 12.6 percent (i.e., the price of 
the illiquid option, the BI option, is 12.6 perecent lower than the price of the ET liquid 
option).  
Insert Table II about here 
 B.2  Method 2 
 The second method is designed to deal with the concern that the results of our 
test  may depend upon the model used. We follow a method offered by Brenner and 
Galai (1993) which allows us to estimate the illiquidity discount in a manner which is 
minimally dependent upon the B-S model. The test uses more information then the 
previous method to create a 90 day ATMF synthetic call interpolated from prices of calls 
from four series with weights based on the BS model. We use two shorter-term call 
options with strike prices that bracket the strike price of the BI option and two longer-
term call options with strike prices that similarly bracket the strike prices of the BI 
options. We then create two synthetic calls, which are close to the money, and finally 
combine the two to create a 90 day ATMF synthetic call as follows.  
 Denote the currency forward exchange rate by TrrSe *)( − , the strike prices by K1 
and K2, where K1< TrrSe *)( − <K2.   CA  and CM  are the actual (A) and model (M) prices.  
First, we compute 
)1)(()(),90( 12111 wKCwKCKTC
AA
−+==           (2) 
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Where, )( 11 KC
A  is the actual price of the short maturity option, )( 12 KC
A  is the actual 
price of the long maturity option and 
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where the weight w  is based on model prices for the corresponding short, long and 90 
day maturities and ),90( 11 KTC
A
=  is the value of a 90 day call with the strike 1K .  The 
model prices use the at-the-money implied volatility. 
Second, we repeat this procedure to compute ),90( 2KTC = . We then combine 
these two synthetic calls to compute our synthetic ATMF 90 days call option, denoted 
C*. 
  )1)(,90(),90( 21
* vKTCvKTCC −=+==        (4) 
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and C* is a synthetic option created from ET options which is compared to the BI option. 
Thus, according to this method we take a weighted average of four ET options to create 
a synthetic price which is compared to the price of the BI option. 
 
 
 
II. Results 
A.  The Illiquidity Discount: Method 1 
The main hypothesis is that non-tradable options should be priced lower than 
similar liquid options. In Table I we have used the B-S model to compute the implied 
standard deviations and compared them.  Another way to measure and present the 
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results of this test is to compare the untransformed BI options premiums to those of 
synthetic options based on the prices of the ET options.  
 We follow the procedure outlined in Table II where we compute the value of an 
option that has the same exercise price and maturity as that of the BI option but uses 
the volatility implied by TASE options. This model value is compared to the auction price 
of the BI option. We then compute the illiquidity discounts (ILD), measured by the 
percentage difference in option premiums between ET options and the non-tradable BI 
options. Table III displays the results of the illiquidity discount. Since WISD, using vega 
weighting, may not fully compensate for the possibility of the known volatility "smile", we 
have used three estimates of volatility. Only the first alternative (column I) uses vega 
weighting across strike prices and maturities based on all ET options traded on day t.  
The second alternative (column II) uses vega weighting across strike prices only, based 
on three ET options closest to ATMF and closest to maturity of the BI options, which is 
effectively similar to equal weighting. The third alternative (column III) uses only one 
option (no weighting at all) that its strike price is the closest to ATMF and is the closest 
in maturity.12  
We find that the BI option price is on the average about 21 perecent lower than 
the ET option price (column 1). The smallest difference, obtained in the most recent 
period is about 17 percent. Similar results were obtained when we used alternative 
estimates of volatility displayed in columns II and III. It seems that the illiquidity discount 
is insensitive to the method of estimating the volatility.13 All the results are statistically 
significant at the one perecent level.  
When we examined the change from the earlier period (1994 to 1995) to the 
latter period (1996 to 1997) we observe that on average, there was a decline in the 
illiquidity discount that could be related to the increased liquidity in the FX spot and FX 
options markets. The increased liquidity in these markets is a result of a change in the 
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central bank intervention policy (to non-intervention inside the FX band) combined with 
lower transactions costs for trading options.14 
 
Insert Table III here 
 
 In Table IV  we present the results by option maturity as auctioned by the Bank 
of Israel. We use the same method as in Table III (method 1). Here we find that both the 
three and six- month ATMF options are discounted by about 21 percent compared to the 
ET options. The null hypothesis of zero difference, no liquidity discount, is rejected at 
the one percent  level for both types of options. Here too we observe a decline in the 
discount from 26.5 percent in the early period (1994 to 1995) to 16.7 percent in the later 
period (1996 to 1997). 15 
 
Insert Table IV about here 
 
Another indication that the discount that we find is due to the illiquidity of the BI 
options is the relationship between volatility and the illiquidity discount (see, for example, 
Longstaff (1995)). We have tested this relationship by regressing the illiquidity discount 
(ILD) against the implied volatility (ISD). The results are: 
 
 
ii ISDILD 0024.404325.0 +−=        %1.21
2
=R    (6) 
                                             (0.086)     (0.000) 
 
The numbers in parenthesis are p-values. We use the ISD of an exchange option that is 
the closest in maturity and strike price to the BI option. Though the variation in the 
implied volatility is not large, we found a positive and significant relationship.16 
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B.  Illiquidity Discount: Method 2 
 In the next test we examine the robustness of the results to the method used.  
We estimate the illiquidity discount in an alternative way, described in the previous 
section (method 2). This method uses two short-term call options with strike prices that 
bracket the forward price and similar two next-term call options. We then create two 
synthetic calls, which are close to the money, and combine the two to create a 90 days 
ATMF synthetic call. The value of this call is compared to the premium paid on the 
option issued by the central bank.  
 
Insert Table V about here 
 
Table V presents the mean percentage difference between the synthetic options, 
based on ET options data, and the BI options. The results are consistent with the earlier 
results.  For the entire sample period the mean difference is about 19.4 percent and is  
significant at the 1 percent level. In the most recent period the difference is still highly 
significant, but lower, about 15 percent. The results of method 2 are indistinguishable 
from the results of method 1. 
 
C.   Illiquidity Discount and Transaction Costs 
In this section we examine whether the cost of replication could fully account for 
the 21 percent discount. A well designed arbitrage would require replicating the BI 
option with the lowest possible costs. Since any replication of the BI options is not 
perfect, dynamic replication will incur some costs. Since in this market, selling and 
buying foreign exchange funds is more costly than selling and buying options, we 
replicate the BI options with ET options. The replication method is as follows: when a BI 
option is offered we calculate the option’s delta using WISD of the three closest ATMF 
exchange traded options with the closest expiration date, computed on the same day. 
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Against the BI option that we buy in the auction, we sell on the first day xt  of ET options 
that result in a delta neutral position. From then on, we recalculate the BI option’s delta, 
each day, in the same manner and sell or buy ∆xt of ET options to regain a delta neutral 
position. The transactions costs incurred using this replicating procedure amount to 
15
1
. ∆xt
t
T
=
∑ when there are T days to expiration. The 1.5 NIS is the cost of buying or 
selling ET options by members of the exchange, paid to the clearing corporation. The 
percentage transactions costs is estimated by 15
1
. /∆x Ct
t
T
BI
=
∑ , where CBI  is the BI call 
price. The idea is to maintain a combined position that is essentially riskless. In doing so 
we incur transactions costs, which account for 12 percent out of the 21 percent. These 
results are presented in Table VI. The remaining gap, about nine percent, is still 
significantly large and is about the same in the most recent period.  This gap can be 
explained by the uncertainty associated with the time span between the submission of 
the bid and the announcement of the winners (between half an hour to an hour). An 
indication that this is the case is given by the significant positive relationship between 
the illiquidity discount (ILD) and implied volatility reported earlier. This relationship 
suggests that when the volatility is larger, arbitragers are more concerned about the 
move of the exchange rate during the time gap and therefore they demand a larger 
discount. Also, there is no evidence of excessive arbitrage activity on auction expiration 
days compared with other days.17 This is another indication that the 9 percent remaining 
gap is due to the uncertainty mentioned above. 
 
Insert Table VI about here 
 
D.  The Illiquidity Discount and the Auction Process 
How competitive is the bidding process and to what extent does the auction 
process drive these sizable discounts? To address this question we first examined the 
auction data regarding the rate of over- and undersubscription at the Bank of Israel 
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auctions. The rate of subscription is measured by the amount of options demanded 
divided by the amount of options offered. In Table VII we find that across all 399 
auctions, the mean rate of subscription is 3.92 (the median is 4.2). The maximum is over 
10 and the minimum is 2 percent.  83 percent of the auctions are oversubscribed. 
 
Insert Table VII about here 
 
 Another indication of the competitevness of the auction process is the deviation 
of the minimum price ( MINBIC ) set for each auction from the average auction price ( BIC ). 
In Table VIII, we find that for the overall sample, MINBIC  is 17 percent lower than BIC . We 
also find that it is 35 percent lower than ETC .  The results in both tables cannot explain 
the large discounts and do not support the possibility that the discounts are driven by 
the auction process.   
Insert Table VIII about here 
 
 Nevertheless, the fact that 17 percent of the auctions were under-subscribed and 
that the deviation,  MINBIC from BIC , ranges from six percent in the early period to 31 
percent in the third period may still indicate that the discounts may be an outcome of the 
auction process. Because of this concern, we examined the relationship between the 
discount (ILD) and the rate of subscription (RS) using a regression test. If the discounts 
are a result of the auction process we should find a negative relationship between RS 
and ILD. The following results show that there is no significant relationship between ILD 
and RS.  
 
     ii RSILD 0034.01972.0 +=        %3.0
2
=R    (7) 
                                              (0.000)     (0.135)  
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Moreover, we computed the average discount for all auctions which were 
oversubscribed (333) and for those that were undersubscribed (66).  The average 
discount is larger (21.6 percent) for the over-subscribed than the average discount for 
the under-subscribed (18.1 percent).  These results provide further evidence that the 
observed discounts are not driven by the auction process. 
 
III. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Given the growing interest among academics and practitioners in the effect of 
liquidity on the values of financial assets, we examine here the effect of illiquidity on the 
value of currency options. In the standard case, illiquidity should not affect a derivative 
asset since options are a zero-sum game. In this paper, however, we use a unique data 
set that allows us to explore this issue in circumstances where the question is relevant. 
We look at currency options issued by a central bank that are not traded until maturity. 
We argue that prices of such options may be affected by illiquidity.  We test our 
hypothesis by comparing these options to similar exchange traded options. The results 
are significant in all cases. We reject the hypothesis that liquidity has no effect on the 
price of the options. We find that the non-tradable options are discounted by about 21 
percent on the average. There was, however, a gradual decline in the discount from 27 
percent in the first period to about 17 percent in the last period. In general, illiquid 
options should not be selling at a discount even when the underlying asset is not liquid. 
The exception is in cases when the options are sold at an auction, as done by some 
central banks. The discount should be a function of the cost of replicating the illiquid 
option. In our case the discount can be explained by transactions costs associated with 
replication and by the time gap during the bidding process.  
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Appendix 
 
The Currency Market in Israel 
A.  The Spot and Forward Currency Market  
 The Israeli Foreign Exchange market has undergone a major transformation in 
recent years, from a market largely controlled by the central bank, to an active interbank 
market which trades continuously but not in a large volume. However, due to several 
restrictions imposed by the central bank,18 market participants are mainly corporations 
who use foreign exchange in their transactions. The banks act as "market makers" since 
all transactions must go through them. At the end of each trading day the central bank 
publishes a settlement (representative) exchange rate for each currency that is based 
on the quotes obtained from the major banks. This is used in settling options at 
expiration.  
Since the early 1990’s the exchange rate regime was a “crawling” peg system. In 
this regime a band was imposed around an upward sloping exchange rate, on a basket 
of five currencies, reflecting the difference in inflation between Israel and the “basket” 
economies. The central bank is committed to intervene only when the band is breached. 
In May 1995, the width of the band was increased from 10 percent to 14 percent and in 
June 1997 it was increased again to 30 percent. Also, until February 1996, the central 
bank intervened occasionally in the FX market to keep the exchange rate around the 
center of the band. It stopped its intervention on February 16, 1996. In our tests we have 
divided the whole sample period into three subperiods in line with the changes in the 
policy of the central bank. The second subperiod starts when the FX band was 
increased from 10 percent to 14 percent. The third subperiod starts when the central 
bank stopped its intervention inside the exchange rate band. 
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B.  Currency Options on the TASE 
 Currency options on the TASE started trading on April 1, 1994. In the first 20 
months, the volume of trading was not high and amounted to 400 contracts a day, on 
the average.  During 1996, the daily volume increased dramatically from 331 contracts 
in January to 5,674 in December of that year. Open interest increased over the same 
interval, from 10,677 contracts in the beginning of the year to 168,212 contracts in 
December. 
 The underlying asset is the dollar denominated in shekel (the domestic            
currency). The options are European puts and calls. They are cash settled, where the 
settlement price is the so-called “representative” exchange rate published daily by the 
Bank of Israel. The maturity cycle is two, four and six months. 
 The options are traded by members of the TASE in an open outcry system, with 
about 20 to 30 traders in the pit, governed by rules and regulations set by the Exchange. 
There is no designated market maker that is committed to quote prices. The tick size for 
options with a premium of 200 to 2,000 NIS is 10 NIS, and is 20 NIS for larger than 
2,000 NIS. The premium for a wide range of options around the money, an average of 
90-day maturity and a volatility of 5 percent to 10 percent are in the range of 200-1000. 
Over 80 percent of the trades in these options are done within one tick, implying that the 
effective bid-ask spread is one tick.  
 
C.  Options Issued by the Bank of Israel 
 The Bank of Israel (BI) started issuing call options (European type) on the dollar 
in November 1989.  Initially, the main reason that the central bank engaged in this 
activity was to enhance the development of the markets for derivatives in Israel. At that 
time no other derivative was traded on the Stock Exchange.  
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 There are two classes of three-month (13 weeks) options auctioned twice a week 
(Tuesday and Thursday). They are issued with two strike prices; exactly at-the-money-
forward (ATMF) and at-the-money (ATM). They also expire on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays. A six-month (26 weeks)  at-the-money forward option is auctioned once a 
week (Thursday). In all auctions, there is a floor (minimum) price which is typically set 
below the comparable price on exchange traded options. 
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Table I 
Sample Statistics of Weighted Implied Standard Deviations (WISD) 
The weighted standard deviation is computed as follows: WISD w ISDi i
i
n
=
=
∑
1
where ISD is the 
implied standard deviation from previous day market call prices, w w wi i i
i
n
=
=
∑* *
1
 
andw C ISDi i i
* /= ∂ ∂ . The exchange traded (ET) WISD is computed using all options traded 
on auction days on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE). The Bank of Israel (BI) WISD is 
computed using all options auctioned in the sample period, December 4, 1994 to June 30, 1997.  
Diff. represents the average differences between ISDs for each day BI option was auctioned. A 
p-value for the differences in means is based on a t-test. A p-value for the differences in 
medians is based on a Kruskal-Wallis (KW) non-parametric test. 
 
 Mean Median S.D. Maximum Minimum 
      
All Sample (n=566)     
TASE 0.0693 0.0629 0.0147 0.1335 0.0342 
Bank Of Israel 0.0492 0.0474 0.0122 0.1173 0.0230 
Diff. 0.0148 0.0147 0.0116 0.0605 -0.0199 
p-value (0.000) (0.000)    
      
Three-month ATM (n=167)     
TASE 0.0653 0.0638 0.0154 0.1335 0.0342 
Bank Of Israel 0.0535 0.0525 0.0138 0.1773 0.0264 
Diff. 0.0118 0.0113 0.0132 0.0605 -0.0199 
p-value (0.000) (0.000)    
      
Three-month ATMF (n=272)       
TASE 0.0625 0.0611 0.0146 0.1335 0.0342 
Bank Of Israel 0.0470 0.0445 0.0117 0.0921 0.0231 
Diff. 0.0155 0.0149 0.0103 0.0563 -0.0065 
p-value (0.000) (0.000)    
      
Six-month ATMF (n=127)     
TASE 0.0653 0.0637 0.0139 0.1062 0.0349 
Bank Of Israel 0.0482 0.0455 0.0102 0.0755 0.0249 
Diff. 0.0171 0.0165 0.0111 0.0516 -0.0056 
p-value (0.000) (0.000)    
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Table II 
 
The Difference Between the Price of an Exchange Traded Option and the Price of 
a Bank of Israel Option:  An Example 
 
The example is based on two options traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) on June 18, 
1996 and their terms (K,T) are the closest to the Bank of Israel (BI) options. The inputs were: S = 
3.261 (NIS/$), 9.16=ISr  percent, 4.5=USr  percent where S is the exchange rate, rIS  is the 
yield on an Israeli three-month T-bill and rUS  is the yield on a U.S. three-month T-bill. We 
computed a weighted implied standard deviation (WISD) using two at-the-monry options traded 
on the exchange.  This WISD was used in computing the price of the synthetic exchange traded 
(ET) option.  The percentage difference between the Central Bank of Israel (BI) option price and 
the synthetic (“market”) ET price is what we call “price of illiquidity” or Illiquidity Discount (ILD).  
 
 Option       
Price 
     Time to  
   Expiration 
Exercise 
Price 
Implied 
standard 
deviation 
     
TASE     
Option 1 0.117 144 days 3.30 6.03% 
Option 2 0.061 71 days 3.30 7.47% 
    
    
Bank of Israel Option 0.0438 91 days 3.34  
Exchange ‘market’ price 0.0501 91 days 3.34 6.66% 
     
Price of illiquidity 0.12610.0501
0.0438ILD =−=
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Table III 
 
The Effect of Liquidity on the Pricing of Currency Options - Method 1 
 
The average illiquidity discount (ILD) is measured by the percentage difference between the price of an 
option traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE), CET, and that issued by the Bank of Israel, CBI, 
using method 1 (Table II). 
   ILD = 1−
ET
BI
C
C  
The numbers presented in column I are based on weighted impkied standard deviation (WISD) using the 
closing prices of all options traded on the exchange in the previous day. The numbers presented in 
column II are based on WISD using the three closest at-the-money options traded on the TASE in the 
same day. The numbers presented in column III are based on ISD using the closest at-the-money option 
traded on the exchange. In the last two columns, the options used are also those with the closest time to 
expiration of the option issued by the Bank of Israel on that day.  All ILDs are significantly different from 
zero at the one percent level. 
 
   Illiquidity Discount 
Period N I  II  III 
From To  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
           
All Sample 399 0.210 0.104  0.204 0.125  0.181 0.127 
4/12/94 5/15/95 132 0.274 0.102  0.297 0.116  0.231 0.151 
5/16/95 2/15/96 111 0.189 0.109  0.195 0,117  0.151 0.132 
2/16/96 6/30/97 156 0.171 0.073  0.148 0.092  0.160 0.079 
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Table IV 
 
The Effect of Illiquidity on the Pricing of Currency Options - Method 1 
by Option Type 
 
In this Table we present the average illiquidity discount, ILD, which is measured by the percentage 
difference between the price of an option traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE), CET, and that 
issued by the Bank of Israel, CBI, using method 1 (Table II). 
  ILD = 1−
ET
BI
C
C  
The numbers presented are based on WISD using the three most at-the-money options traded on the 
TASE in the previous day. The numbers presented in column I are the illiquidity discounts of at-the-
money-forward options issued by the Bank of Israel with three months to maturity. The numbers 
presented in column II are the illiquidity discount of at-the-money-forward options issued by the Bank of 
Israel with six months to maturity.  All ILDs are significantly different from zero at the one percent level. 
 
  Illiquidity Discount 
Period       I  three-month ATMF  II   six-month ATMF 
From To N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
        
All Sample 272 0.210 0.105 127 0.211 0.174 
4/12/94 5/15/95 98 0.265 0.106 34 0.302 0.086 
5/16/95 2/15/96 73 0.197 0.111 38 0.174 0.106 
2/16/96 6/30/97 101 0.167 0.071 55 0.180 0.076 
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Table V 
The Effect of Liquidity on the Pricing of Currency Options - Method 2 
The average illiquidity discount (ILD) measured by the percentage difference between the 
price of an option traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Echange (TASE), CET, and the one issued by 
the Bank of Israel (BI), CBI, using method 2 described in Section II. The BI at-the-money-
forward  (ATMF) option is compared to a synthetic call option which is obtained by 
interpolating four series of exchange traded (ET) options with weights based on the Black-
Scholes model.  The number of observations shrinks to 165 BI options (auctions) since we 
could not always obtain all four series of ET options especially for the six-month ATMF. All 
mean ILDs are significantly different from zero at the one percent level. 
 
Period  Illiquidity Discount   
From To N Mean S.D.   
       
All Sample 165 0.194 0.098   
4/12/94 5/15/95 56 0.240 0.111   
5/16/95 2/15/96 37 0.212 0.098   
2/16/96 6/30/97 72 0.150 0.064   
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Table VI 
 
The Illiquidity Discount and Transactions costs 
Transactions costs are calculated by replicating the Bank of Israel (BI) options with 
exchange traded (ET) options in the following way. When a BI option is offered we 
calculate the option’s delta using weighted implied standard deviation (WISD) of the 
three closest at-the-money-forward (ATMF) ET options at day t-1. Against the BI option 
we sell on the first day xt  ET options which results in a delta neutral position. Each day, 
we recalculate the BI option’s delta in the same manner and sell or buy ∆xt to regain a 
delta neutral position. The transaction costs incurred using this replicating procedure 
amounts to 15
1
. ∆xt
t
T
=
∑ when there are T days to expiration assuming that buying or 
selling an ET option costs 1.5 NIS. The percentage transaction cost is estimated by 
15
1
. /∆x Ct
t
T
BI
=
∑ . 
 
Period  Illiquidity Discount 
From To N Mean S.D. 
     
All Sample 319 0.1246 0.0846 
4/12/94 5/15/95 114 0.1327 0.0644 
5/16/95 2/15/96 99 0.1631 0.1148 
2/16/96 6/30/97 106 0.0804 0.0378 
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Table VII 
 
  The Rate of Subscription at Bank of Israel Auctions 
 
Rate of subscription is calculated as a ratio of the amount of options demanded at the auctions divided 
by the amount offered. Number of undersubscribed represents the number of times the auctions were 
undersubscribed. 
 
Period 
From To 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
 
Median 
 
Min 
 
Max 
No. of 
under 
Subscribed 
         
All Sample 399 3.92 2.32 4.20 0.02 10.32 66 
4/12/94 5/15/95 132 3.47 2.54 3.52 0.02 10.32 34 
5/16/95 2/15/96 111 3.30 2.37 3.78 0.04 7.83 30 
2/16/96 6/30/97 156 4.74 1.79 4.78 0.15 9.00    2 
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Table VIII 
 
Descriptive Statistics of MINBIC relative to BIC and ETC  
 
MIN
BIC is the minimum price set by the Bank of Israel (BI) for the auction. BIC is the average auction 
price. ETC is the price of the exchange traded (ET) option. ETC is calculated using method 1 (Table 
II). 1−BI
MIN
BI CC  measures the percent 
MIN
BIC is lower than BIC .  1−ET
MIN
BI CC measures the 
percent MINBIC is lower than ETC . 
 
Period  1−BI
MIN
BI CC   1−ET
MIN
BI CC  
From To N Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
        
        
All sample 399 0.172 0.160  0.351 0.139 
12/4/94 15/5/95 132 0.062 0.084  0.318 0.125 
16/5/95 15/2/96 111 0.103 0.118  0.275 0.130 
16/2/96 30/6/97 156 0.314 0.125  0.432 0.113 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1 See Demsetz (1968) and more recent studies by Christie and Huang (1994) and 
Huang and Stoll (1996) on the relationship between liquidity and bid-ask spreads.  
2 See also Kadlec and McConell (1994) and Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997).  
3  Leland (1985), Boyle and Vorst (1992) and Toft (1994) introduced transactions costs 
into the BS model.  Their analysis, however, is concerned with the costs of trading the 
underlying asset and its effect on the option.  We are concentrating on the liquidity of 
the option itself. 
4 Examples of illiquid options include options granted to executives, tailor-made OTC 
options, etc. 
5 Commercial banks offer non-standardized over-the-counter options issued sporadically 
depending on the demand for FX options. 
6 See the Appendix for a detailed description of the currency market in Israel. 
7 During the sample period there were no bidders in nine auctions of the ATMF options 
and in 105 auctions of the ATM three-month options.   
8 We use the average quotes, for the ET options, since most foreign exchange 
transactions are done at the “representative” rate, based on mid-day bank quotes.  
9 The bids submitted by the clients through branch offices of their banks are not known 
to the main office, which deals with the bank’s own account (Chinese walls). 
10 We exclude ET options that violate the basic arbitrage (Merton's) conditions, since 
these violations are usually for out-of-the-money options that trade infrequently and are 
not synchronous with the exchange rate. Since the BI options are issued ATM or ATMF 
and are auctioned with a minimum price, the arbitrage conditions are never violated for 
these options.   
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11 Several banks that regularly participate in these auctions were asked to explain their 
lack of interest in the ATM options raised this point. This is also the reason why the 
Bank of Israel stopped recently issuing the ATM options. 
12 We tested if there is a volatility “smile” for the options that we used. The test 
compares ISD of options which are out-of-the-money with options that are in-the-money. 
The following results indicate that there is no significant difference between ISDs of the 
options that were used for interpolation. 
 Out-of-the-money In-the-money t-value p-value 
     
ISD 0.0648 0.0617 1.27 0.20 
     
 
13 Since we use transaction prices that blend bid and ask prices, it may be argued that 
the bid-ask spread can explain most of the illiquidity discount. However, as it turns out, 
the bid-ask spread in this market is rather narrow and its effect on our results is 
negligible. As described in the Appendix, in over 80 percent of the trades the effective 
bid-ask spread is one tick (half of it is about one percent of the premium). Even if we 
use two ticks, half of the spread for an average premium of 500 NIS would amount to 
two percent of the option premium, which will reduce the average discount from 21 
percent to 19 percent.  
14 We also use two additional alternative inputs of the underlying exchange rate; the 
previous day FX rate and the next day FX rate. The need for these alternative inputs 
stems from a potential bias in our estimates due to a synchronization issue of the 
exchange rate with the option prices, when we use representative exchange rates set by 
the central bank reflecting mid-day transactions.  The results are essentially the same 
as in Table III.  
 
 31 
 
15 It could be argued that there is a tax effect. Under the tax code, individuals are 
exempt from taxes on TASE securities but not on the BI options. Other market 
participants (corporations, money managers) are not exempt. However, since only a 
fraction of trading in the FX market is done by individuals, we believe that the tax effect 
is negligible and cannot explain the difference that we observe. 
16 This particular test was suggested to us by the referee. 
 
17 The average daily volume on auction expiration days was 993 contracts, compared 
with 897 contracts on other days. The difference is statistically insignificant (p-value of 
0.287). 
18 Recently the central bank has dropped many of these restrictions.  
